"We see the world through language; but how should we understand this metaphor?" (Davidson 1997; 15) Die "role of language in our thinking about the world" (17): "that language is opaque, hiding the real thing from us"; "that language is a translucent medium, leaving its own character written on everything in its domain"; "that language is transparent, a medium that can accurately represent the facts". (Davidson 1997; 17) Aber: "language is not a medium through which we see; it does not mediate between us and the world. (...) Language does not mirror or represent reality, any more than our senses present us with no more than appearances." (Davidson 1997; 18) "We do not see the world through our eyes, but with them. (...) The is a non-metaphorical point of my titel. There is a valid analogy between having eyes and ears, and having language: all three organs with which we come into direct contact with our environment. There are not intermediaries, screens, media, or windows." Und: "there is no such thing as a language apart from from the sounds and marks people make, and the habits and expectations that go with them." (Davidson 1997; 18)
The "relation between language and thought" (Davidson 1997; 19): "Speech, like sense organs, has its specialized location in the brain" - aber: keine "internal language, the language of thought, or mentalese" a la Chomsky, Fodor, Pinker et al. (Davidson 1997; 19); denn: "The arguments for the existence of a language of thought prior to, or independent of, a socially engineered language are feeble." (Davidson 1997; 20) "There is no reason to suppose that ideas, concepts or meanings are innate if this is taken to mean anything more than that people have come to have languages and thoughts that reflect the needs and interests of human animals." (Davidson 1997; 21) "In any case, my contention is (...) that we are not born with anything like a contentful language". (Davidson 1997; 21) Denn: "semantics has to do with reference and truth". (Davidson 1997; 21) "What matters (...) is that once in place, language (...) is, or has become, a mode of perception. However, speech is not just one more organ; it is essential to the other senses if they are to yield propositional knowledge. Language is the organ of propositional perception. Seeing sights and hearing sounds does not require thought with propositional content; perceiving how things are does, and this ability develops along with language." (Davidson 1997; 22) Nur "propositional perception" garantiert "epistemic support" für "perceptual beliefs" (Davidson 1997; 22); und "beliefs" sind "epistemically supported by nothing more than other beliefs" (Davidson 1997; 23)
Aber "what role can nature play in determining the contents of beliefs"? (Davidson 1997; 23) Davidson geht - auf exemplarische Weise - von den "perceptual sentences" (Davidson 1997; 23) aus: "Understanding the sentence depends on prior theory, without which the content would be totally unlike what we think of as the meaning." (Davidson 1997; 24) Und zwar "theory, in a sense that extends theory to cover tacit understanding": "Even a simple sentence like ´That´s a spoon´ (perhaps boiled down to ´Spoon!´) if understood requires knowledge of what spoons are for, that they are persistent physical objects, and so on." Dabei "in the process, ostension, or what amounts to it, plays a major role." Also ist schon so gesehen "the lone gatherer" eine Fiktion! (Davidson 1997; 24)
Aber gibt es nicht so etwas wie Vorstufen propositionaler Erkenntnis, propositionalen Wissens, kann oder muß man nicht die "connection between concepts and thoughts" entsprechend verstehen? Davidson konstatiert, "that concept-formation is not a way station between mere dispositions, no matter how complex or learned, and judgement." Die "concept-formation" (Davidson 1997; 25) ist keineswegs "more primitive than entering the world of propositional attitudes, in particular, of beliefs": "To have a concept is to classify objects or properties or events or situations while understanding that what has been classified may not belong in the assigned class. The infant may never say ´Mama´ except when its mother is present, but this does not prove conceptualisation, even on a primitive level, unless a mistake would be recognised as a mistake. Thus there is in fact no distinction between having a concept and having thoughts with propositional content, since one cannot have the concept of mama unless one can believe someone is (or is not) mama, or wish that mama were present, or feel angry that mama is not satisfying some desire." (Davidson 1997; 25) <Mit einem Satz: schon (elementare) Unterscheidungen treffen zu können, schließt propositionale Wahrnehmung, also ein Sehen-mit-der-Sprache, ein! <Hinsichtlich des Verständnisses der "elementary situation" (Davidson 1997; 26) sprachlicher Unterscheidung(en): Parallelen zu Kuno Lorenz´ Handlunsgtheorie elementater Prädikation...>>
<Und die Genese?> "Learning requires three modes of generalisations: the learned association of fire and hurt requires two, and the learning is displayed in similarity of the responses: we avoid hurt by avoiding fire. Before there can be learning there must be unlearned modes of generalisation. Before there can be language there must be shared modes of generalisation." (Davidson 1997; 26) "The sharing of responses to stimuli found similar allows an interpersonal element to emerge: creatures that share responses can correlate each other's responses with what there are responses to. Person A responds to person B´s responses to situations both A and B find similar. A triangle thus is set up, the three corners being A, B, and the objects, events, or situations to which they mutually respond." (Davidson 1997; 26) "This elaborate, but commonplace, triangular interaction between creatures and a shared environment does not require thought or language; it occurs with great frequency among animals that neither think nor talk. Birds and fish do it as well as monkeys, elephants and whales." (Davidson 1997; 26)
"What more is there to linguistic communication and developed thought? The answer is, I think, two things that depend on the basic triangle and emerge from it. The first is the concept of error, appreciation of the distinction between belief and truth. The interactions of the triangle do not in themselves generate this appreciation, as we see from the example of simple animals, but the triangle does make room for the concept of error (and hence truth) in situations in which the correlation of reactions that have been repeatedly shared can be seen by the sharers to break down; one creature reacts in a way previously associated by both creatures with a certain sort of situation, but the other does not. (...) ..., they have grasped the concept of truth." (Davidson 1997; 26/27) - Aber: "With the second, final, step we move in a circle, for we grasp the concept of truth only if we can communicate the contents - the propositional contents - of the shared experience, and this requires language." (Davidson 1997; 27) "The primitive triangle, constituted by two (and typically more than two) creatures reacting in concert to features of the world and to each other´s reactions, thus provides the framework in which thought and language can evolve. Neither thought nor language, according to this account, can come first, for each requires the other. This presents no puzzle about priorities; the abilitiy to speak, perceive and think develop together, gradually. We perceive the world through language, that is through having language." (Davidson 1997; 27)
<In diesem Sinn ist die Sprache das konstitutive kognitive Medium2 intersubjektiver propositionaler Wahrnehmung, propositionaler Erkenntnis, propositionales Wissens. Im Unterschied zum Medium1, dem Spiegelbild der Wirklichkeit (Davidson 1997; 18).
<Im ganzen: auch inhaltliche, insbesondere (logisch- wie phylo-)genetische Bezüge zu Deacons Theorie der Koevolution von Sprache, Bewußtsein, Gehirn?!!>
Martin Seels Rezension (Seel 1999): "die Sprache" - so im Sinne von Davidson - "ist die Art, wie wir Welt haben. Sie ist kein Fenster, kein Bildschirm, kein Mittleres und daher für Davidson auch kein Medium." "Sprache und Denken sind strikt interdependent. Sie entwickeln sich simultan." "Doch Vorsicht - Davidson gebraucht den Begriff des Mediums in einem sehr eingeschränkten Sinn." Ähnlich wie Gadamer denke Davidson durchaus "die Sprache als das ´universale Medium, in dem sich alles Verstehen vollzieht´. Auch hier tritt die Sprache nicht als ein Instrument, sondern als ein unverzichtbares Element des Denkens auf. Nur im Fluß der Sprache kann sich das Denken bewegen - darin stimmen beide Autoren trotz der divergierenden Wortwahl überein." (Seel 1999; 46)